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GENERALISTS VERSUS SPECIALISTS: SKILL USE IN COM PARATIVE  
PERSPECTIVE
1. Introduction: there is a repeated overestimation o f property issue
After the Second World War, a particular system o f the political-ideological and 
economic monopoly has been created in the Central (Eastern) European countries, 
including Hungary. The political-ideological monopoly was represented by the 
monolithic party (party-state) system and its dominant Marxist ideology - these are 
well known and well documented characteristics of the ex-socialist system in Europe. 
The economic monopoly has been based, first o f all, on the almost full nationalization 
of the industrial, trade, service and partly the agricultural sectors. To illustrate the 
extent o f changes in the Hungarian property structure, it is worth to note that, before 
the Second World War, only 10 % o f the industrial assets were state owned. (Bakos, 
1991, 3.) The economic monopoly based not only on the almost exclusive property 
rights o f the state, but also on the over centralized organizational structure of the so- 
called "command economy". For instance, the average number of persons employed in 
the socialist firms was more than twice as much than in the capitalist firms. (Komai,
1989.) This economic monopoly was completed by a hegemonic position of the 
Marxist ideology, which overemphasized the positive impact of the enormous changes 
in the property structure in the country. According to that mechanistic social view in 
relation to socialism, the elimination of the private ownership in the economy in itself 
could produce harmonious social relations at the workplace and in the society as a 
whole. This simplistic approach overlooked the fact that the overthrow of the private 
ownership will not produce automatically the overthrow of the relations of interest and 
power related to the division and specialization of work, not speaking about les o f the 
other social and economic institutions (for instance, the centralized redistribution of 
resources lacking the social control, non-tolerance of the individual and collective 
(civil) initiatives etc.) which have an important and long lasting impact on the integra­
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tive mechanisms both at national and firm level. This conflict-free view of society was 
questioned in Hungary from the early 1970’s on. Industrial sociologists produced 
convincing empirical evidence about the power and interests conflicts at the work-place 
level, resulting in the well known practice of "restriction of output". (Hethy & Mako 
1988.)
Today, we can assist to a very similar kind of social view; the present radical shift 
from the hegemonistic Marxist ideology related to the dominance of state property, 
into the direction of the liberal-conservative one, based on the dominance o f private 
ownership. This ideology and the policy of privatization based on it, intend to neglect 
again the complexity of social relations and its effects in the firm. The supporters of 
this approach - like their ancestors who tried to create homogeneous state property 
structure - have a belief that private property in itself could create the market economy 
and improved economic performance both at firm and national level. For instance, they 
do not want to realize in the functioning of the economy the importance o f the range 
of economic and social factors influencing the use of property. (Richet 1991.)
In this paper, we try to identify some of the social mechanisms regulating human 
cooperation - through that economic performance - within the firm. In relation to that 
we hope also to demonstrate the autonomous role of the "qualificational" and 
"organizational" spaces in which any kind of "property relations" are embedded at firm 
level. For instance, the patterns and values of behaviours are shaped in the long run - 
among other factors - by the methods and institutions of the education and training, 
promotion and career system, etc. functioning in the economic organization. The 
practice of skill use and promotion within the firm plays the role of a "learning 
process" shaping the participant’s values and attitudes.
Using the tool o f a cross national survey, we try to identify and compare the 
heterogeneous practice of the skill utilization, training policy and job mobility in the 
large firms working in the state or quasi-state (it means overregulated private sector) 
sectors o f the energy production. (Ishikawa, Mako & Novoszath 1991.)
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Before presenting some results o f the comparative analysis, we would like to raise 
briefly some risks of the cross national surveys or in general o f the international 
comparative work. A source of frequent distortions lies in, for instance, the inclination 
of social scientists in the countries of the Central (Eastern) European region to 
compare realities prevailing in their own (national) institutions (for instance the 
existing system of training and retraining) to the idealized image o f similar institutions 
in the developed (capitalist) countries. There is another danger, no less frequent and 
increasingly felt, that specialists, (consultants) from countries with a developed market 
economy and a democratic system, offering their services within the framework of 
various assistance programs, view the current difficulties and the social-cultural 
heritage in the ex-socialist countries with an approach learned within the political and 
economic context o f their own societies. This is apt to result in diagnoses which regard 
differences from the economic and political institutions of the advanced capitalist 
countries simply as a phenomenon of economic and social backwardness. The 
particular performance of the Japanese society and economy which has deviated from 
North American or Western European models o f the market economy, without usually 
seeming less efficient, represents another viable model of development. (Humprey 
1988.)
2. Purpose and field of research
The research project aimed at a comparative analysis of the educational-training 
practice, job mobility and promotion system, work organization and decision making 
system, labour relations and trust relations within the Hungarian and Japanese power 
plants.
The design and methods of research originally were elaborated by the Japanese 
research team (headed by Akihiro Ishikawa) but the Hungarian research team members 
extensively used during the field-work the techniques of the "focused-interview" and 
heavily relied to the use of company statistics and documents. The data obtained by the 
standard questionnaire were analyzed by the methods of multi-variate analysis. The
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joint-survey was carried out in 1988-1989, and in some respects - labour relations, 
decision-making - it was repeated in 1992.
For the purpose of the joint survey, the Japanese research team selected two firms, 
namely Kashima Power Plant in Ibaraki Prefecture and Hirono Power Plant in 
Fukushima Prefecture, both belonging to the Tokyo Metropolitan Electric Power 
Corporation. The fuel used by the Japanes power plants are oil and gas, and both of 
them are highly automated. The number of people surveyed in these two firms was 
467.
The two Hungarian firms involved in this international project were Tisza Power Plant 
in Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen Prefecture and Gyongyos Power Plant in Heves Prefecture, 
both situated in the Northern Hungary. The selected power plants are belonging to the 
Hungarian Power Works Co. Ltd.
The first Hungarian Power Plant uses gas and coal for the energy production. The 
second one is a coal based power plant. The level o f automation in the Hungarian 
power plants lags behind the level o f Japanese power plants.
In this paper, we intend to present some characteristics o f the skill use and training 
policy as well as the job mobility and pattern of promotion comparing the Hungarian 
and the Japanese company’s practice.
3. Education and training. The roles o f "Off JT" and "OJT"
A comparison of the data for the two countries showed that the average level of 
schooling was higher for employees in the Japanese power plants than for those in the 
Hungarian power plants participating in the joint survey.
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Level o f Education at the Power Plants, %
(1989)
Hungary Japan
Primary school (8 or 9 years) 20.0 3.2
Secondary School (4 years) 66.8 81.5
Higher education (3-5 years) 7.7 15.5
N.A. 3.5 0.8
Note: In Japan the average blue collar worker finished the ninth grade’s primary school 
already in the 1960’s.
"Lifetime employment" is the cornerstone of the Japan’s organization oriented" 
employment system. The large firms - as the power plants surveyed - employ the 
personnel throughout the entire working life, from entry into service till the end of the 
working career. In return, employees have to show maximum loyalty and commitment 
to their company. Naturally this system of loyalty implies a considerable restriction of 
individual freedom of choice. The lack of mobility between firms is replaced by the 
maintenance of a "learning community" in the large firms. This means that the 
"lifetime employment" system is fully developed only in the large firm’s sector in 
Japan. Only the "core" manpower can enjoy this priviledge o f employment stability. 
This represents only about 20-25 % of the total workforce. The peripheral workforce 
composed by unskilled workers, women or employees in the small firms and 
subcontracting firms’ sector are excluded from this system of employment. This is well 
illustrated by the results of multi-variate dispersion analysis in the case o f the Japanese 
power plants, as this is the probable explanation for the fact that those employees who
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had previous employment elsewhere have a much lower level o f qualification than the 
rest o f employees. Characteristically, only one third of them completed the primary 
school level, none possessed secondary education, and as low as 6.7 % had university 
degree. (We should like to note that in the Japanese power plants, the personnel 
management does not use the category of "blue collar workers", but only the notion of 
"employees".)
The noticeable differences in the formal education in relation to the length of service 
in the firm are symptoms of a very strong tendency for the Japanese power plants to 
employ as highly qualified personnel as possible. Among the employees with less than 
four years o f service, we found none with only primary education, whereas the ratio 
of employees with university diploma was 40 % for those with one year o f service, 
and 30.8 % for those with three or four years o f service in the same enterprise. As can 
be seen, the level o f formal education has an increasing role to play in the treatment 
o f newcomers by the Japanese power plants. In addition, there is a great emphasis in 
recruiting new entrants, that is so characteristic o f the large Japanese firms partici­
pating in the cross-national survey running their own ("home") educational institutions, 
to which young people are admitted, and accommodated in the company operated 
student’s hostels, following the nine years of general education. Further there is 
training designed to the special manpower policy of the power plants, which has an 
ambition to employ mainly students graduating from their company’s school. 
Moreover, the training of new entrants is not limited to the completion of studies in 
these "home" educational institutions, but really begins in effect after recruitment, in 
the form o f "on the job-training" (JOT). As a matter o f fact, vocational training in 
Japan begins, as a rule, not at school, but at the firms, where employees receive 
training in a variety of skills and even university graduates are trained - by rotation 
jobs - to become multi-skilled "generalists" instead of "specialists". This training 
process is usually rather long (10 to 15 years) and rather costly, an aspect which along 
with tradition is an important economic motive of "lifetime employment". Avoiding 
the overheated debate over the schemes of "generalist vs specialist" training practiced 
by the large Japanese firms, we would like to call attention to another dimension of the
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Japanese human resource policy: the importance of the so-called "slow-track" 
compared to the "fast-track" promotion systems widely used by European - including 
Hungarian firms. (Koike 1991.) We will discuss it in more detail in the next part the 
paper.
The other important feature of qualifications (or in more general sense of skills) is 
their more homogeneous character in the Japanese power plants compared to the 
Hungarian ones. Among employees of the Japanese power plants none was found to 
possess anything less than secondary school diplomas whereas university degrees were 
held by 25 % of the employees. By contrast, 29 % of the workers in the Hungarian 
power plants completed primary school (eight grades) and as low as 0.4 % finished 
secondary school ("college").
University and college graduates at the Japanese firms do not hesitate at all to start 
their careers at production related jobs, that are low in the hierarchy of the jobs and 
but appreciate the importance "on the job-training" (OJT).
"First we engage all our engineers in direct production for a sufficiently long period 
for them to understand how the jobs they are doing fit into the production technology. 
Certain foreign engineers dislike this, but according to all indications, Japanese 
engineers are glad to be able to gain "first hand" experience". (Morita 1989, 11.)
By contrast, the Hungarian power plants assign newly recruited university graduates a 
priori to white collar jobs, a reason why Hungarian workers show notable differences 
not only in the level o f education but also in the content o f the skills:
"The company management made a mistake of pooling engineers in one department, 
although they would be needed here in the workshop, where even research engineers 
could be working on the project development with greater efficiency." - said one 
maintenance worker.
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Blue collar workers at shop-floor level and those in charge to manage production show 
great differences in schooling. For instance, in the case of blue collar workers and 
middle and top managers in the Hungarian power plants, the only common schooling 
experience consists o f the compulsory eight grades o f primary school.
At the Hungarian power plants, the average number of grades completed is 12.57 years 
with a standard deviation of 2.86 years, meaning that in the case o f 95 % of the 
interviewed the number of grades completed varies between 12.57 (+2.86) and 12.57 
(-2 .86).
Job categories and the years o f schooling
Job title
Average number 
of years completed
Standard
deviation
Blue collar worker 10.77 1.96
Clerical employee 12.12 1.18
Technical employee 14.93 2.64
First line supervisor 13.79 2.12
Middle and top manager 15.87 2.47
The differences in standard deviation indicate the degree of homogeneity of the 
different job categories. According to that, the job category of the clerical employees 
is the least homogeneous one. Another important feature of the skill use in the 
Hungarian power plants is that the differences in the level of education (qualification) 
between members in the various job categories were widened rather than narrowed by 
the further education or training (Off Job-Training, OJT) organized by the company 
itself. This is most striking when blue collar workers and clerical employees generally
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with lower level o f education starting their career in the firm are compared with 
technical employees as well as with middle and top level managers, who started their 
career with higher level of education. For instance, 85.3 % o f the workforce in the 
Hungarian power plants (91 % of blue collar workers and 98 % of administrative 
employees) did not obtain higher education than their starting level o f education in the 
firm, whereas one-half of technical employees and first line supervisors and 58 % of 
the middle and top managers improved their starting level o f education. It is not by 
chance that those with university or college diploma, who are employed in the 
Hungarian power plants try to avoid jobs in the workshop and wish to increase their 
formal level o f qualification at the educational institutions rather than to participate in 
the practice on the job training (OJT). When it comes to chances of promotion, 
participation in the formal education and the documented knowledge - that is off the 
job training (Off JT) has a dominant role to play. Formal schooling is overestimated 
and the practical knowledge is underestimated in the training policy of the firms, 
despite the fact that, as is shown by international experiences, the formal education 
conveys but a small part o f desirable skills. In relation to the importance of the OJT, 
it is worth to note the lesson drawn from the comparison of the Japanese and South- 
East Asian worker’s performance in the automated process (cement) industry; "The 
cross-national discrepancy in the proportion of production workers who are capable of 
handling unusual operations is substantial, particularly when it comes to dealing with 
problems. Most production workers can conduct such work in the Japanese case, but 
no more than 10-20% can do so in the Malaysian and Thai cases." (Koike & Takenori
1990, 22.) The same rate is valid for the production employees in the Japanese power 
plants and about 30 to 40 % of the production workers are capable of handing non­
routine cases in the Hungarian power plants.
Workers’ undocumented "tacit skill" and invisible experiences are accessible to 
employees working in other job categories (for instance managers and technical 
employees) mainly in the form of professional cooperation in the labour process. This 
is why the informal relations and the good relations with the "workshop-community" 
for the management play particular significance to guarantee the smooth functioning
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of production. But the overestimation of the formal schooling (Off JT) and systematic 
underestimation of OJT in the promotion policy of the Hungarian power plants raise 
non-negligeble difficulties for the cooperation between production workers and those 
who are responsible to organize and manage the labour process. The different 
knowledge and work-related values as well as the social models o f cooperation 
embodied in them do not homogenize, instead they heterogenize social relations in the 
firm. For instance, both groups, the blue collar workers and technical employees 
(engineers) witness daily conflicts and tensions, yet, characteristically, they form quite 
different ideas and methods how to eliminate them.
From the position of the blue collar workers, university graduates should learn more 
practical experience at workshop level;
"...technical employees have a very high level o f technical knowledge, but very little 
practical experience. Therefore they have no prestige in the eyes of workers. We have 
suggested in various ways that young engineers should start on shop-floor level." 
(skilled worker.)
On the other hand, engineers and medium and top level managers expect to eliminate 
the conflicts described above, thanks to the creation of an "intermediate job category": 
the job o f the so-called "production technician" who could play the "role of bridge" 
between the blue collar workers and engineers and managers.
The Japanese managers in the power plants tend likewise to highly estimate the 
university degree, but by no means underestimate practical knowledge acquired in 
production (in the form of OJT), so their value orientation is centered on "proven 
ability" rather than on "documented ability".
4. Promotion system: "slow track" versus "fast track" career
In the joint survey we considered jobs to be one of the most important variables in 
analyzing social relations in the work organization.
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Job categories by countries, %
Job categories
Hungary Japan
Blue collar workers 76.6 2.6
Clerical employees 9.1 18.2
Technical employees 5.4 56.2
First-line supervisors 5.4 1.3
Middle & top managers 3.3 19.1
N.A. 0.2 2.6
The ratio o f blue collar workers at the Japanese power plants is strikingly low (2.6 %). 
This can be explained by the unique personnel policy of the Japanese power plants - 
participating in the joint survey - which does not use the category of "blue collar 
worker". People engaged in production and doing no administrative tasks are officially 
classified as technical employees. It would also be noted about this job classification 
that after the Second World War, an important segment of large Japanese companies 
abolished the categories o f "manual" and "non-manual" workers, but retained the 
differentiation between "blue collar" (KOIN) and "white collar" (SHOKIUN) staffs 
(the former represents workers and the latter staff members who start their careers as 
clerks and technical employees.) Although "white collar" workers stand greater chances 
of promotion to middle and top level managerial positions, differences in earnings, 
other benefits and employment conditions are minimal between "blue collar" and 
"white collar" workers. It is equally surprising that in the Japanese power plants the 
combined proportion of workers and technical employees is just short o f 59 % and that
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of the first-line supervisor is as low as 1.3 %, whereas the proportion of clerical 
(administrative) employees is 18.2 %, twice the proportion for the Hungarian power 
plants. The proportions o f the various job categories do not allow by themselves any 
conclusion to be drawn about the efficient operation of any economic organization. 
Contrary to the public belief in Hungary, a low proportion of administrative and 
managerial staff is not necessarily a criteria o f well-functioning organizations. 
Different proportions of employees in these job categories may result in equally 
outstanding or poor records of firms’ performance.
Concerning the promotion system, the most surprising difference is in that while in 
Japanese power plants promotion depends mainly on age and the length o f service, in 
the Hungarian power plants it depends more on the jobs held at the time of taking up 
employment and the level o f formal education. An essential element o f the Japanese 
promotion system is, (as in the case of the incentive system, NENKO) seniority, that 
is to say career development in rank and position depends primarily on the length of 
service in the firm, employees being differentiated by individual performance criteria 
only after length of service. This practice reflects the logic o f the "slow track" career 
mechanism. People are chosen for senior or managerial position not simply because of 
academic qualifications, but because they have demonstrated their abilities during the 
job-training (OJT) and in enlisting their collegues’ cooperation.
Large firms in Japan do not usually assign outsiders to senior positions. It is virtually 
impossible for someone to start his career in a senior (or managerial) position; only 2 
% o f managers covered by the joint survey started employment in jobs similar to those 
they held at present and the rest started as subordinates. As opposed to the "fast track" 
career development in the Hungarian power plants, Japanese firms select top managers 
after long years o f professional practice (15 years, as a rule). Contrary to the widely 
held views, this is not a long-standing cultural tradition (one element o f the "unique 
Japanese working culture"), as this system of "low track" career has not established 
itself until at the turn of the century when heavy industry was replacing the dominant 
role o f light industry. Its greatest merit is that managerial posts are filled with people
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after a long period of a learning and evaluation process. This system of promotion is 
more suitable to "weed" those unfit for leadership and management.
By contrast, in the case of the Hungarian power plants, 6.8% of the first-line 
supervisors and 16.3% of middle and top level managers started their careers as such 
at their present company, whereas 6.3% of the them held lower level managerial 
positions. Apart from the fact that a considerable proportion of managers at the 
Hungarian power plants started their careers in managerial positions, it is worth to note 
that a rather high proportion of them had never been engaged in direct production 
before they filled managerial posts. This holds for 27.2% of the first-line managers and 
three quarters o f middle and top level managers in the Hungarian power plants. In 
addition, nearly two thirds o f technical employees, who are the primary source of 
management recruitment, were not engaged in direct production in their previous jobs.
The employees’ professional career involves both "upward" and "downward" mobility 
during working life, with typical variations also found in respect o f the latter at the 
firms in the two countries. At the Hungarian power plants there were no cases of 
"downward" mobility, except two administrative employees who had become workers. 
The professional and moral respect o f management is substantially eroded by the near 
impossibility o f "downward" mobility from senior positions. As one first-line 
supervisor noticed; "There was no change in enterprise management either with the 
same persons responsible for the bad situation still sitting there. The enterprise saw no 
change. Managerial posts are still held by the same people who have filled them for 30 
years. Some changes are noticeable in few respects. Sooner or later, there’s got to be 
a change in this respect as well. We have at the enterprise a second-ranking group of 
young managers, who might be able to change things, provided the old ones allowed 
them some scope to do so."
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5. Some concluding remarks
The so-called "high involvement working systems" and the functional flexibility 
(internal mobility), commonly known characteristics of the human resource policy in 
the large Japanes firms, are inseparable from the social-organizational dimensions of 
the skill utilization and the promotion system. Along with the officially recognized 
knowledge (high appreciation of diplomas), incentives for and recognition o f efforts to 
participate on the job-training (OJT) and to acquire a "proven knowledge" are playing 
a central role in the training and promotion policies. In this system o f manpower use, 
there is no clear-cut job demarcation and individual task-assignment. The importance 
of the acquisition of practical knowledge and the accumulation of skills are well 
reflected in the joint-survey data, according to which as low as 2% of Japanese 
managers started their career as managers. By contrast, the proportion of managers 
starting their career as managers was found to be several times higher than that figure 
in the Hungarian power plants.
The Hungarian power plants’ job policy is characterized by rigid job demarcation and 
correspondingly an overspecialized skill and manpower use. In most cases, the shared 
common professional experiences and values are missing in the relations between blue 
collar workers, engineers and managers. Plus, the remarkable differences in the level 
o f official qualifications, are not reduced by the company efforts in the forms o f OFF 
JT or OJT. This means that in the Hungarian firms, the role of "organizational space" 
is much stronger than the role of "qualifications space" in the creation of cooperation 
among the partners o f the labour process.
The promotion system in the Hungarian power plants is not only characterized by its 
"fast track" nature, but also by the overestimation of the role of "documented 
knowledge" (diploma) at the expense of "proven knowledge".
Unfortunately, today’s overheated debate about the speed, methods, origin of new 
owners etc. o f privatization is diverting attention from the social-organizational context
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of property. This is also true in the case of the Hungarian power plants whose property 
structure also underwent important changes during last two years. But the system of 
skill use and promotion have functioned basically according to the pattern described in 
this paper.
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